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BUYER'S REMORSE OVER YOUR PENNSYLVANIA GAS LEASE?
THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS MEAGER
ROYALTY PAYMENTS AND PROTECTS THE PROFITABILITY
OF MARCELLUS GAS DRILLING IN KILMER V ELEXCO
LAND SERVICES, INC.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Marcellus Shale is the largest unconventional reserve of
natural gas in the world, containing at least 489 trillion cubic feet of
natural gas-enough fuel to meet current domestic demand for
natural gas for fourteen years.' The Marcellus Shale is a formation
of sedimentary rock below much of the Appalachian Mountains
from New York to West Virginia. 2 The organic material trapped
inside the sedimentary rock formation, commonly referred to as
"source rock," has formed natural gas over millions of years." Since
the discovery of the Marcellus Shale nearly 190 years ago, the
Marcellus Shale was considered an economically unviable source of
energy since the pockets of gas were surrounded by nearly impermeable rock.4 Recent technological developments, however, transformed the previously thought uneconomic resource into a
marketable source of energy.5 In 2008, a boom in exploration and

1. TIMOTHY CONSIDINE ET AL., THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSIlY, AN EMERGINC GIANT: PROSPECTS AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF DEVELOPING THE MARCELLUS
SHALE NATURAL GAs PLAY ii (2009), available at http://alleghenyconference.org/

PDFs/PELMisc/PSUStudyMarcellusShale072409.PDF (describing underlying significance of Marcellus Natural Gas on future of gas industry).
2. Id. at 2 (locating Marcellus shale in strata of rock beneath Pennsylvania
topography).
3. See id. at 4 (describing brief history of Marcellus gas mining); see also GOVERNOR'S

MARCELLUS

SHALE ADVISORY COMM'N, GOVERNOR'S MARCELLUS SHALE ADvi-

SORY COMMISSION REPORT 19 (July 22, 2011), available at http://files.dep.state.pa.

us/PublicParticipation/MarcellusShaleAdvisoryCommission/MarcellusShaleAdvisoryPortalFiles/MSACFinalReport.pdf (describing geologic formation of
Marcellus shale gas deposits over time).
4. See CONSIDINE ET AL., supra note 1, at 1-6 (describing how advancements in

horizontal fracturing technology increase gas production and value of mineral
rights).
5. Laura C. Reeder, Creating a Legal Framework for Regulation of Natural Gas
Extractionfrom the Marcellus Shale Formation, 34 WM. & MARY ENVrL. L. & POL'Y REV.
999, 1000-01 (2010) (stating horizontal fracturing created boom environment for
gas drilling).

(25)
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mining of the Marcellus Shale gas began, which some commentators equate to a modern-day gold rush or oil fever.6
For over a century, gas-mining companies have relied upon oil
and gas leases, otherwise known as mineral rights leases, to secure
subsurface oil and gas from privately-owned lands without actually
purchasing the land.7 Leasing operations in Pennsylvania were well
established long before the Marcellus Shale mining boom gained
steam in 2008.8 The gas-mining business in Pennsylvania was slow
through 2007 compared to the large boom in gas mining activity
that began in 2008.9 Leases signed prior to 2007 compensating
Marcellus Shale landowners for their mineral rights paid minimum
production royalties because of minimal demand for the seemingly
unviable shale gas.10 The 2008 shale boom drastically changed the
dynamics of royalty payments, as gas companies were increasingly
willing to pay landowners larger royalties to access the shale lying
beneath their properties." The swell in gas lease values forced
landowners, who already leased their gas rights, to desperately seek
a way out of their pre-existing, undervalued leases-thus creating
the source of conflict between landowners and gas companies at
issue in Kilmer v. Elexco Land Services, Inc. (Kilmer) .12
II.

FACTS

In Kilmer, the plaintiff landowners signed gas leases with the
defendant Elexco Land Services in 2007 for a comparatively de
minimis sum, and now sought to have their leases invalidated by the
Pennsylvania courts.13 The landowners exchanged with Elexco the
right to extract natural gas from beneath their property for a royalty
6. George A. Bibikos & Jeffrey C. King, A Primer on Oil and Gas Law in the
Marcellus Shale States, 4 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 155, 156 (2008-2009) (describing "gold-rush mentality" among gas extractors in Marcellus states).
7. See, e.g., id. at 171-73 (discussing history of Pennsylvania gas leases).
8. See CONSIDINE ET AL., supra note 1, at 19 (depicting 2008 expansion of
Marcellus drilling in Pennsylvania).
9. See GOVERNOR'S MARCELLUS SHALE ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 3, at 33-34

(reporting massive increase in well permit applications beginning in 2008 and continuing through present day).
10. See Reeder, supra note 5, at 1006 (noting statistics reflecting surge in royalty percentages following 2008 boom in gas drilling).
11. Id. at 1006-07 (discussing rationale behind landlords' uncertainty towards
entering into leases).
12. Kilmer v. Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 990 A.2d 1147, 1149 (Pa. 2010)
(describing underlying motivation of plaintiff landowners to break gas leases
signed pre-2008 when values for gas leases were significantly lower than time of
litigation).
13. Id. at 1150 (reviewing basis for original January 2008 suit).
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of one-eighth of the value of the natural gas removed or recovered,
as well as a "signing bonus" of $100 per acre leased.' 4 Recently,
post-2008 lease agreements include royalties in excess of twenty percent, and bonus payments as high as $2,800 per acre.' 5 As the basis
for their claim, the plaintiff landowners asserted their lease provisions violated the Pennsylvania Guaranteed Minimum Royalty Act
(GMRA), which guarantees landowners a "one-eighth royalty of all
oil, natural gas or gas of other designations removed or recovered
from the subject real property."1 6
As the plaintiffs signed a lease guaranteeing a royalty for the
precise amount dictated by the GMRA and using language mirroring that of the GMRA, a layperson might inquire what grounds the
landowners have for claiming their leases are untenable.1 7 The answer, and fundamental issue here decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, is how to define the term "royalty" and precisely what
Pennsylvania law requires in the calculation of such payments.',
Pennsylvania trial courts heard seventy similar claims from landowners seeking to renegotiate their gas leases at the time Kilmer was
appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 19 The claims raised a
substantive legal issue not yet addressed by the Pennsylvania courts;
thus the Pennsylvania Supreme Court exercised extraordinary jurisdiction to resolve the issue. 20
A.

Plaintiff Landowners' Argument

The landowners in Kilmer argued Pennsylvania should adopt
the "First Marketable Product Doctrine" for defining and calculating natural gas royalties. 2 ' The landowners alleged the natural gas
royalties should be calculated as a percentage of the total proceeds
14. Id. at 1150 n.5 (reciting royalty provision from landowner's lease and citing bonus $100 per acre payment paid to landowners in present case and current
bonus payments paid of $2,800 per acre).
15. See Reeder, supra note 5, at 1006 (nothing surge in royalties following
2008 gas drilling boom); see also Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1150, n.5 (citing current bonus
payments paid of $2,800 per acre).
16. Guaranteed Minimum Royalty Act of 1979, 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 33
(West 1979) (guaranteeing one-eighth royalty to lessors of natural gas rights); see
also Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1150 (explaining plaintiffs statutory claim).
17. Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1150-51 (presenting court with absolute question of
law as to what GMRA guaranteed to landowners in royalty interests).
18. Id. at 1151 (noting ultimate issue at dispute in Kilmer).
19. Id. (acknowledging upwards of seventy suits on hold when litigation was
pending).
20. Id. (describing basis for supreme court exercising extraordinary jurisdiction over appeal in case).
21. Id. at 1152 (introducing landowners' claim under first marketable product doctrine).
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from the market sale of the gas.2 2 Under the construction of their
current lease, the landowners received a one-eighth royalty calculated using the "net back" method, which subtracts the gas company's post-production costs from the sale revenue when
calculating the royalty payments.2 3
The landowners point to Pennsylvania law which includes an
implied duty to market in gas leases, such that a gas company is
under an obligation to sell the gas to which it leased the rights in
order to ensure the lessor receives just compensation for his lease.2 4
The landowners claim this recognized duty indicates that royalties,
as conceived by the state legislature when passing the GMRA, must
be based on the price of gas when sold. 2 5 The landowners argue
Pennsylvania should adopt the precedent set by federal law, as well
as Kansas, Oklahoma, and Wyoming state law, which implies calculation of royalties based on the first marketable product doctrine.26
According to the landowners, this interpretation of the GMRA
matches the Pennsylvania legislature's intent at the time of passage
in 1979.27 Finally, the landowners rely upon the Pennsylvania rules
of statutory construction, which mandate statutes must be inter28
preted to remediate the problems they were intended to address.
B.

Gas Companies' Argument

Elexco Land Services and Southwest Energy Corporation refute the landowners' argument that gas royalties should be calculated according to the first marketable product doctrine; instead,
they assert the net back calculation complies with the terms of the
lease at issue and the GMRA.29 The net back method approximates
22. See Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1152 (explaining first marketable product doctrine
requires gas companies to pay share of gross revenue received from sale of gas,
without subtracting post-production expenses).
23. Id. at 1149 (stating lease in question, and many other gas leases in Pennsylvania, use net back methodology, which subtracts post-production costs from
royalty paid to landowners).
24. Id. at 1152 (discussing connection between implied duty to market previously established in Pennsylvania and potential corresponding mandate to follow
first marketable product doctrine).
25. Id. (noting other states that recognize implied duty to market follow first
marketable product doctrine).
26. Id. (citing survey of gas lease law of other gas-producing states).
27. Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1153 (discussing legislative intent claims).
28. See id. (describing purpose of Pennsylvania rules of statutory construction
is to "remed[y] the perceived mischief addressed therein").
29. Id. at 1154 (outlining gas companies' core arguments).
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the value of the raw gas when it is extracted from the earth.30 The
gas companies argue a plain reading of the GMRA indicates the
Pennsylvania legislature implicitly contemplated that the calculation of royalties is based on the value of the gas "removed or recovered" from the real property in question.3 1
Gas drillers such as Southwestern Energy add considerable
value to natural gas by the time it is brought to market by bearing
all post-production costs. 3 2 Post-production costs include: the expense of processing, transporting, and storing all product extracted
from the wellhead.33 These costs, which are never borne by landowners, account for the majority of a gas company's operational
expenses and constitute significant value added to the extracted gas
by turning it into a marketable product. 34 According to the gas

companies, the only fair mechanism to approximate the value of
the natural gas at the point "removed or recovered" is by subtracting the post-production costs from the revenue received at the
market.3 5 The gas companies assert the term royalty has developed
a technical implied meaning in the natural gas extraction industry
that relies on calculations according to the net back method.3 6
III.

A.

BACKGROUND

The Guaranteed Minimum Royalty Act

Pennsylvania is the only state to guarantee lessors receive a
minimum percentage of oil and gas revenue derived from extraction on leased land.3 7 Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision as to which royalty calculation method will be read into both
outstanding gas leases and the GMRA itself greatly impacts both
30. SeeWILLAMS & MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS (Patrick H. Martin

& Bruce M. Kramer eds., 14th ed. 2009), availableat LexisNexis 8-N Manual of Oil
and Gas Terms N (defining net back method of calculating market value of oil).
31. See Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1154 (asserting plain reading of GMRA language
indicates legislature intended royalties are calculated on value of gas at moment
removed or recovered from ground).
32. See WILLAMS & MEYERS, supra note 30 (listing additional value-added services provided by gas extractors after production).
33. See Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1150 n.3 (noting relevant provision of landowners'
2007 lease interpreted post-production costs).
34. Id. at 1154 (explaining value added by post-production costs incurred by
gas companies in shale gas production).
35. See Kilner, 990 A.2d at 1154 (describing gas companies' claim that net
back is fair approximation of gas value at wellhead).
36. Id. at 1154-55 (summarizing assertion that technical interpretation of royalty is required by Pennsylvania rules of statutory construction).
37. See Bibikos & King, supra note 6, at 181 (indicating uniqueness of Pennsylvania's GMRA).
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present and future leases.38 In 1979, following extensive debate
upon the constitutionality of such a law, and without any mention
in the legislative record as to how to define the term royalty, the
Pennsylvania legislature passed the controversial provision guaranteeing a one-eighth royalty share to lessors.39
Absent an authoritative legislative history or formal definition,
the landowners in Kilmer appealed to other methods of statutory
interpretation to yield a definition of royalty excluding post-production costs. 40 The landowners believe the definition of royalty
should be imported from an earlier Pennsylvania gas law, which defines "royalty owner" as "any owner of an interest in oil or gas lease
which entitles him to share in the production . . . without obligating
him to pay any costs under such lease."4 1 If read in concert with the

GMRA, a court could potentially conclude the definition of royalty
owner excludes both production and post-production costs from
royalty calculations.4 2
In further support of the landowners' proposed interpretation,
they claim the Pennsylvania rules of statutory construction require
courts to interpret the GMRA in a manner favorable to their disposition. 4 3 Pennsylvania law requires courts to effectuate the intent of
the General Assembly, and the intent should be discerned from a
list of factors, including: "(1) [t]he occasion and necessity for the
statute[,] (2) [t]he circumstances under which it was enacted[,
and] (3) [t]he mischief to be remedied."4 4 Yet, as the gas companies counter, the same law also prohibits an interpretation of the
law that is "impossible of execution or unreasonable." 45 The absence of a clear definition of royalty, as guaranteed to landowners
38. For a discussion of the impact of court-approved net back method on
Pennsylvania gas industry, see infra notes 182-207.
39. See S.B. 568, 163rd Gen. Assemb. (Pa. 1979) (failing to properly define
royalty interest).
40. See Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1153 (stating different ways to define royalty
interest).
41. Id. (emphasis added)

(citing 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

§

402(8) (West

1961)) (defining "royalty owner").
42. See Brief for Appellant at 12, Kilmer v. Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 990 A.2d
1147 (Pa. 2010) (No. 63 MAP 2009), 2009 WL 6346618, at *12-13 (arguing GMRA
should be read pari materia with Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Conservation Law).
43. Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1153 (recounting plaintiff landowners' argument that
GMRA constitutes remedial statute, and therefore it must be interpreted to effectuate its remedial purpose).
44. 1 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN.

§

1921 (c) (West 1972) (listing factors General

Assembly may consider when words of statute are not explicit).
45. Id. at § 1922 (stating General Assembly is not to reach absurd results in
interpretation of non-explicit language of statute).
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in gas leases by the Pennsylvania GMRA, is the source of the controversy in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Kilmer decision.4 6
B.

Net Back Is the Federal Methodology for Gas Royalty
Calculation

A majority of state jurisdictions use the net back method to
calculate gas royalties, and federal courts recognize net back for
extraction lease agreements from federal lands.47 These jurisdictions are known as "at-the-well" because the royalty approximates a
percentage of the value of the gas at the time it reaches the wellhead.4 8 This method, grounded in property rights, allows the lessor
to retain a fractional property interest in the gas at the time it is
extracted, and all subsequent expenditures by the lessee to add
value to the gas must be compensated. 49
In the current marketplace, natural gas is not monetized at the
point of extraction.5 0 Due to a shift in the market structure toward
vertical integration, a gas company, such as Southwest, may not only
extract the gas, but also process, store, and transport it to end users
in markets such as New York, Pittsburgh, and Philadelphia (the
largest consumption centers surrounding the Marcellus Shale).51
To determine the fair market value of gas at the wellhead, the net
back method subtracts all of the post-extraction costs incurred by
the gas company from the sale price at the end market.5 2 This calculation method is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations to
exclude the "costs of transportation, processing, or manufacturing"
from the value of the gas extracted and sold at the market.5 3 Unlike most gas-producing jurisdictions, Pennsylvania courts have, un46. See Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1149 (indicating case at bar concerns proper construction of term royalty within GMRA).
47. See Bibikos & King, supra note 6, at 169 (describing legal background for
states following net back methodology, known as "at-the-well" jurisdictions).
48. Id. at 169-70 (describing method for calculating royalty percentage in atthe-well jurisdictions).
49. Id. (describing rationale behind net back methodology).
50. See CONSIDINE ET AL., supra note 1, at 16 (explaining gas produced from

well heads is not ready for sale because gas must go through several processes
become marketable).
51. See id. at 11-16 (presenting most significant consumption markets for
Marcellus shale gas, and tracing process for bringing gas to market).
52. See Bibikos & King, supra note 6, at 169-70 (describing royalty calculation
using net back methodology).
53. Product Valuation: Federal Gas, 30 CFR § 1206.151 (2010) (detailing net
back royalty calculation method used in federal gas lease arrangements).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012

7

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 2

32

VILLANovA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw jouRNAL

[Vol. XXIII: p. 25

til now, remained curiously silent on whether or not net back is an
54
implied component of gas leases.
C.

The Implied Duty to Market and the First Marketable
Product Doctrine

Pennsylvania, like most states with a substantial body of oil and
gas law, recognizes an "implied duty to market" oil and gas.5 5 The
duty applies to any lessee who contracts with a landowning lessor
for the right to extract minerals from the lessor's land in exchange
for a royalty share of the extracting lessee's proceeds.5 6 The implied duty to market obligates a lessee gas extractor to market any
gas capable of extraction from the land so long as sufficient quantities can be produced to justify the expense of bringing the gas to
the market.5 7 The implied duty protects a lessor landowner by creating an obligation "to operate for the common good of both parties."5 8 In Pennsylvania, the existence of such a duty stems from a
long-standing precedent in lams v. Carnegia Natural Gas Co.
(lams),6 in which the plaintiff landowner leased his mineral rights
to the defendant gas company in exchange for the first $500 of annual revenue from the sale of gas.60 Although the gas company
found significant subterranean gas reserves, it chose not to move
forward with extraction. 6 ' This inaction deprived the landowners
of due compensation for their lease or the alternative ability to
lease the mineral rights to another party. 62 The unjust nature of
54. See Bibikos & King, supra note 6, at 181 (indicating relative silence of
Pennsylvania courts on gas lease royalty issues since enactment of 1979 Minimum
Royalty Act).
55. See Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1152 (acknowledging existence of implied duty to
market under Pennsylvania law).
56. Bruce M. Kramer & Chris Pearson, The Implied Marketing Covenant in Oil
and Gas Leases: Some Needed Changes for the 80's, 46 LA. L. REv. 787, 792 (1986)
(stating lams clarifies basic principles of implied covenant to market); see also HowARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, VOL. 5 OIL AND GAS LAw 3 (2007) (noting
implied covenants in gas leases were "launched" by Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Stoddard v. Emery, 128 Pa. 436, 18 A. 339 (1889)).
57. See Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1152 (describing current state of implied duty to
market).
58. Id. (quoting lams v. Carnegie Natural Gas Co., 45 A. 54, 55 (Pa. 1899))
(describing effect of implied duty to market).
59. See lams, 45 A. at 54-55 (determining whether lessee is bound by duty to
market gas and other mineral products capable of extraction from leased land
where lease agreement expressly contemplates such activity).
60. See id. at 54 (relating facts of case and terms of lease).
61. See id. (describing gas companies' decision not to extract gas and bring it
to market).
62. Id. at 55 (holding lessor of gas rights must make reasonable efforts to
monetize gas available for extraction).
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this arrangement led to the establishment of then implied duty to
market.6 3
In Kilmer, the plaintiff landowners asserted the implied duty to
market created a legal basis known as the first marketable product
doctrine.6 4 The Kilmer landowners, as well as several states, derive a
secondary duty from the doctrine that compels lessee gas extractors
to "bear all the costs necessary to market the natural gas obtained
from the Plaintiffs' property to the point of sale." 65 Under the first
marketable product doctrine, a gas company is obligated to market
any gas extracted from leased land and absorb the costs of bringing
it to the market.6 6 Without such a duty, a situation could exist in
which a gas company is required to extract and sell the gas, but the
landowner receives nothing because the post-production costs exceed the value of the gas extracted.6 7
Other states without a statute similar to Pennsylvania's GMRA,
have recognized a derivative first marketable product doctrine
stemming from the implied duty to market.6 " In Kilmer, the plaintiffs drew from the Kansas Supreme Court, which found: "If it is the
lessee's obligation to market the product, it seems necessary to follow that his is the task also to prepare it for market, if it is unmerchantable in its natural form."6 9 The plaintiffs also cited the
Oklahoma Supreme Court, which found: "We interpret the lessees
duty to market to include the cost of preparing the gas for market."7 0 Finally, the plaintiffs cited the Colorado Supreme Court as
stating: "In our view the implied covenant to market obligates the
lessee to incur those post-production costs necessary to place gas in
a condition acceptable for market."7 '
63. See Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1152 (describing rationale for implied duty to
market).
64. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 42, at *940 (outlining claim for first
marketable product doctrine in Pennsylvania).
65. Id. at *10 (describing basis for first marketable product doctrine).
66. See id. (describing inherent duty of lessee to absorb all costs necessary to
market natural gas).
67. Id. (describing consequences of not following first marketable product
doctrine).
68. See Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1152, 1155 (indicating courts of other states have
recognized utilization of first marketable product doctrine).
69. Brief for Appellant, supra note 42, at *10 (quoting Gilmore v. Superior Oil
Co., 388 P.2d 602 (Kan. 1964)) (asserting first marketable product doctrine calculates gas royalties in Kansas).
70. Id. (quoting Wood v. TXO Production Corp., 854 P.2d 880 (Okla. 1993))
(stating oil and gas lessor should be required to pay portion of oil and gas compression costs).
71. Id. (quoting Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1994)) (asserting owner of overriding royalty interest in gas production is required to bear pro-
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Ultimately, the plaintiffs in Kilmer wanted the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to conclude the Pennsylvania legislature, in adopting
the GMRA while cognizant of the common law "implied duty to
market precedent," explicitly adopted a first marketable product
approach to gas royalty calculation. 72 If this were the legislature's
intent, then the practices undertaken by the defendants in the
course of performance with the specific gas lease at issue here
would be distinctly violative of the GMRA. 73 Pennsylvania, however,
has never explicitly adopted the above-cited doctrine.7 4 Professor
Bruce Kramer of the Texas Tech School of Law, the principal supporter of the first marketable product doctrine, filed an amicus curiae brief against Pennsylvania law and in favor of the alternative
net back method.7 5
D.

Recent Case Law Developments in the Battle Between Net
Back and First Marketable Product Doctrine

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the lower state courts
were not the first courts to confront the issue of the validity of the
net back gas royalty calculation method under Pennsylvania law. 76
The Middle District of Pennsylvania heard two cases with fact patterns nearly identical to Kilmer, and the court addressed the validity
of a gas lease operating under the net back method.7 7 In both
Kropa v. Cabot Oil and Gas Corp. (Kropa) and Stone v. Elexco Land
Services (Stone), the plaintiffs brought suit in federal court seeking
invalidation of their Marcellus Shale natural gas leases based, at
portionate share of postproduction costs incurred to convert raw gas into
marketable product, absent contrary provision in the assignment creating overriding royalty interest).
72. See Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1152-54 (describing landowner's claims for first
marketable product doctrine).
73. Id. at 1156 (summarizing court's resolve to follow legislative intent, albeit
in accordance with rules of statutory interpretation).
74. Id. at 1157-58 (dismissing landowners' assertion that legislature intended
first marketable product doctrine).
75. See Brief for Bruce Kraemer as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees,
Kilmer v. Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 990 A.2d 1147 (Pa. 2010), 2009 WL 6346625 at
*14 (rejecting landowner's interpretation of Kraemer's scholarship).
76. See Stone v. Elexco Land Servs., Inc., No. 3:09cv264, 2009 WL 1515251, at
*2-3 (M.D. Pa. Jun. 1, 2009) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss as legal question since interpretation of royalty provision was yet unanswered); see also Kropa v.
Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 372, 373 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (refusing to
dismiss claims for invalidation of gas leases based on theory that net back violated
GMRA).
77. See Stone, 2009 WL 1515251, at *2 (declining to reach conclusion on royalty issue); see also Kropa, 609 F. Supp.2d at 373 (describing facts of respective
cases).
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least partially, on arguments that the net beck royalty calculations
violated the Pennsylvania GMRA. 78
The federal district court in both cases explicitly recognized
that Pennsylvania courts were currently considering the same issue
in Kilmer at the trial court level in the Susquehanna County Court
of Common Pleas. 79 While the Kilmer trial court found the GMRA
"does not prohibit the inclusion of 'post-production' costs to calculate the one-eighth royalty," the federal district court was "not convinced that merely because the [GMRA] is silent on whether postproduction costs can be deducted means that costs can in fact be
legally deducted from the royalty."8 0 The federal district court, in
contrast to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, found a "plain meaning" reading of the GMRA does not allow post-production costs be
netted out of a landowner's royalty.'
Contrary to the defendant gas companies' argument in Kilmer,
however, a plain meaning statutory interpretation is not conclusory.8 2 The Pennsylvania rules of statutory interpretation indicate "technical words and phrases and such others as have acquired
a peculiar and appropriate meaning or are defined in this part,
shall be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate
meaning or definition."8 3 The defendant gas companies in Kilmer
claim the term royalty takes on a specific meaning as a technical
term within the natural gas industry, and thus courts should define
or interpret it in accordance with this technical meaning. 8 4 Of
course the technical definition of royalty proposed by the gas company is one that specifically removes all post-production costs from
the market sale price of the gas in question.85 In both Kropa and
Stone, however, the federal district court interpreted lams and the
78. See Stone, 2009 WL 1515251 at *1 (stating plaintiffs claims of fraudulent
inducement and invalidity of lease because failed to provide royalty payment minimum); Kropa, 609 F. Supp.2d at 373-74 (summarizing respective plaintiffs' claims).
79. See Kropa, 609 F. Supp.2d at 380 n.7 (establishing federal court awaited
Kilmer decision for interpretation of state law).
80. Kilmer v. Elexco Land Servs., Inc., No. 2008-57, 2009 WL 6404985, at *2-3
(Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 16, 2009) (describing trial court decision); Kropa, 609 F.
Supp.2d at 380 n.7 (indicating federal court's reluctance to acknowledge that silence of GMRA on issue permits net back calculations).
81. See Kropa, 609 F. Supp.2d at 381 (holding case cannot be dismissed based
on theory that GMRA permits net back).
82. See Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1157 (delineating differences between statutory interpretation of technical terms and ordinary terms).
83. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

§

1903(a) (West 1972) (stating rule on interpreta-

tion of technical terms in Pennsylvania statutes).
84. See Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1155 (summarizing gas companies' argument on
distinction between technical terms and those defined by common usage).
85. Id. (quoting industry manual definition proposed by gas companies).
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implied duty to market as potentially prohibiting the gas companies' preferred net-back method and requiring the calculation of
royalties as a raw one-eighth share of the sale price of gas at the
market.8 6
In the absence of a GMRA-like statute, many states struggle to
interpret gas lease royalty provisions that are silent on calculation
methodology.8 7 In facing this issue, the Colorado Supreme Court
issued an opinion in 1994 that included a comprehensive survey of
various states' common law on the issue.8 8 In Garman v. Conoco, Inc.
(Garman),89 Conoco, a major U.S. based oil and gas producer, referred to the plaintiff landowners' assertion of a first marketable
product doctrine as a "desire to get a 'free-ride' on certain costs
incurred after the gas is brought to the surface."9 0 Upon hearing
this certified question of law from the federal district court, the
court ultimately decided the relationship between landowner and
lessee "specifically provides for a 'free-ride' on costs incurred to establish marketable production." 9 '
After surveying law in Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Kansas, Arkansas, and North Dakota, the Colorado Supreme Court found Conoco's argument that industry practice has taken on a specific
technical meaning for royalty inclusive of net back unpersuasive.9 2
The court reasoned that before common landowners must have full
understanding of a term before being bound by the meaning of a

86. See generally Kropa, 609 F. Supp.2d at 381-83 (denying defendant's motion
to dismiss and acknowledging merit of plaintiffs argument with regard to royalty
definition); see also Stone, 2009 WL 1515251, at *7-8 (stating holding).
87. See Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652, 653 (Colo. 1994) (attempting
to interpret Colorado lease provisions). The court posited whether:
Under Colorado law, . . . the owner of an overriding royalty interest in gas
production [is] required to bear a proportionate share of post-production costs, such as processing, transportation, and compression, when the
assignment creating the overriding royalty interest is silent as to how postproduction costs are to be borne?
Id.
88. Id. at 652-58 (surveying results of other states' litigation over validity of net
back royalty calculation).
89. Garman, 886 P.2d at 661 (explaining holding). Under Colorado law,
"overriding royalty interest owners are not obligated to bear any share of postproduction expenses, such as compressing, transporting and processing, undertaken to transform raw gas produced at the surface into a marketable product." Id.
90. Id. at 657 (stating gas companies' assertion of invalidity of landowners'
argument).
91. Id. (leading to conclusion of validity of first marketable product doctrine).
92. See id. at 660 (finding many states upheld landowner-friendly interpretation of lease provisions guaranteeing royalties by rejecting net back).
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technical term.9 3 Often, a landowner who enters into such a lease

agreement will be dealing
only time, and will have no
mineral development."9 4
Kilmer, however, ultimately
owner should be required
royalty.9 5
E.

with the gas industry for the first and
reason to be aware of the "intricacies of
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
found differently, and reasoned a landto abide by the technical meaning of

Proposed Legislative Solutions to the Kilmer Controversy

Following the Kilmer decision, the Pennsylvania General Assembly considered a bill, entitled "An act regulating the terms and conditions of certain leases regarding natural gas and oil," which would
have statutorily mandated gas royalty payments not deduct
post-production costs incurred by gas companies.9 6 The bill specifically forbade the net back methodology and increased the guaranteed minimum royalty to fifteen percent.9 7 The measure passed the
House Environmental Resources and Energy Committee on a
purely party-line vote, but never received an up-or-down vote in the
House Appropriations Committee.9 8 Rather than take such an extreme protective measure in favor of Pennsylvania landowners over
gas companies, the Pennsylvania legislature has currently shifted its
focus to a possible severance tax on gas drillers of the Marcellus
Shale in an attempt to capture some of their revenue for the benefit of Pennsylvania taxpayers.9 9
IV.

NARRATIVE ANALYSIs

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court began in Kilmer by stating
the underlying motive behind the plaintiff landowners' claim is to
93. Id. (reasoning landowner cannot be bound to lease term without understanding the term).
94. Garman, 886 P.2d at 660 (recognizing Conoco is more sophisticated in
lease negotiations than landowner and possesses unfair upper-hand).
95. See Kilmer v. Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 990 A.2d 1147, 1157 (Pa. 2010)
(concluding term royalty is to be interpreted in accordance with technical
meaning).
96. H.B. 2214, 193rd Leg. 2d Sess. (Pa. 2010) (introducing amendments to
GMRA).
97. Id. (stating terms of amendment to GMRA and proposing substantially
increased minimum royalties).
98. Bill Information: House Bill 2214, PENNSYLVANIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, http://

www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/billinfo.cfm?syear-2009&sind=0&body=H&
type=B&bn=2214 (last accessed Oct. 27, 2010) (indicating bill has been re-committed to Appropriation Committee since May 26, 2010).
99. See H.B. 1489, 193rd Leg. 2d Sess. (Pa. 2010) (introducing severance tax
on Marcellus Shale gas extracted from Pennsylvania land).
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garner more attractive gas lease terms and higher royalty payments.1 00 The Court cites the 2007 surged interest in gas drilling,
the spike in value of gas leases, and the relative inexpensiveness of
landowner royalties in current leases as the reasons why the landowners sought a court to invalidate their leases. 0 1 By placing these
motives at the front of the opinion, it is evident the court did not
sympathize with the landowner's unfavorable contractual standing
with the lessee gas companies.1 0 2
The court recognized the novelty of the issue before it.103 The
Susquehanna Court of Common Pleas, upon issuing its initial decision at trial, determined that no Pennsylvania appellate court previously addressed the issue of royalty calculation.1 04 Thus, because of
the enormous number of cases on the state court dockets depending on the gas royalty resolution, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
exercised extraordinary jurisdiction on the purely legal question of
how to effectively define royalty within the context of gas leases and
the GMRA. 10 5 The court stated the standard of review on this
purely legal issue was de novo. 0 6
A.

Legislative Intent of the Pennsylvania General Assembly in
1979

Ultimately, the fundamental issue of law in Kilmer was the
Pennsylvania General Assembly's intended definition of royalty
when it constructed and passed the GMRA in 1979.107 The GMRA
is silent on the issue, and the court refused to accept either party's
argument that definitions from outside statutes should be read into
the GMRA as indicative of the intent behind this specific provi100. See Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1149-50 (describing effect of upsurge in interest in
Marcellus gas drilling on landowners).
101. Id. at 1150 (explaining landowners desire to invalidate gas leases).
102. See id. at 1158 (holding landowners are not entitled to invalidate their
leases).
103. Id. at 1151 (citing trial court's conclusion that no Pennsylvania appellate
court previously ruled on issue of royalty calculation under GMRA).
104. Id. (recognizing trial court's inability to effectively decide case based on
precedent).
105. Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1151 (describing backlog of cases that developed
while awaiting definitive word from supreme court on validity of net back royalty
calculations).
106. Id. (exercising extraordinary jurisdiction over purely legal issue led to de
novo standard of review).
107. Id. at 1156-58 (finding most relevant arguments to pertain to statutory
interpretation and legislative intent for definition of term royalty).
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sion. 0 8 The court states, "the GMRA does not use any of the terms
suggested by the parties, such as 'at the wellhead,' 'post-production
costs,' or 'point of sale."' 10 9 The court instead believed there was
good reason for the absence of any further details expounding
upon how and where to calculate royalties as a percentage of
sale. 110
Drawing from the detailed histories of the Pennsylvania oil and
gas industries provided by the parties, the court recognized that in
1979 the sale of natural gas at the wellhead and at the market were
one in the same."' Prior to the modernization of the gas industry,
drillers and extractors were separate from the pipeline companies.1 12 In 1979, gas-extracting companies such as Southwestern
would sell the extracted gas directly to the pipeline company, literally at the wellhead, for federally regulated prices." 3 In the three
decades since the GMRA was enacted, gas companies have become
vertically integrated, and now own the pipelines.1 14 Additionally,
gas prices are no longer federally regulated." 6 Yet the court found
that in 1979 there was only one conceivable price from which to
calculate the one-eighth royalty share-the price paid by the extractor to the pipeline company.1 16 The court, therefore, recognized
that in light of industrial development, it needed to provide its own
definition of royalty. 1 7
B.

The Court's Definition of Royalty

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized the stark contrast
between the landowner's conception of the term royalty and the
108. Id. at 1157 (noting silence of Pennsylvania General Assembly on definition of royalty, and rejecting conclusive arguments of both parties).
109. Id. (rejecting proposed definitions set forth by litigating parties).
110. Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1157 (noting reasons for absence of statutory
definition).
111. Id. (concluding there was no reason to differentiate at-the-wellhead price
when GMRA was passed in 1979).
112. Id, (stating background history of Pennsylvania gas industry in 1979).
113. Id. (explaining gas industry operations in 1979 utilized separate pipeline
companies).
114. See id. at 1157 (concluding gas industry underwent substantial structural
changes in three decades since GMRA was passed).
115. Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1157 (noting absence of federal regulation of gas
price).
116. Id. (interpreting legislative intent in 1979 was based upon system of gas
transactions that no longer exists).
117. Id. (concluding absence of relevant and conclusive legislative intent
leaves interpretation to judiciary).
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defendant gas companies' conception.' 1 8 The landowners sought a
definition derived from common meaning and standard dictionary
definitions." 9 The gas companies wanted to define royalty according to a technical meaning.120 The court knew it had to make an
initial determination between common and technical usage, and
the Pennsylvania rules of statutory construction delineate two separate methods for arriving at a definition. 12 1 The court indicated it
viewed the term as technical-having acquired a "peculiar and appropriate meaning."1 2 2 The court, therefore, launched into an
analysis of the technical meaning, and thereby rejected the landowners' plain meaning argument.1 2 3
The court cited the Manual of Oil and Gas Terms to define royalty as "[t] he landowner's share of production, free of expenses of
production." 2 4 Based on this industry-specific definition, the court
distinguished between "expenses of production" and "post-production costs."12 5 The court stated the expenses of production include
the costs associated with drilling the gas wells and extracting the gas
to the surface of the land.12 6 These costs were not in question, and
under any interpretation of the gas lease at issue, were borne exclusively by the gas company.12 7 The court reasoned the inclusion of
the term "free of production costs" specifically excluded post-production costs from the above-cited technical definition of royalty.' 28
The court cited support for this analysis from a treatise written by
George Bibikos, a K&L Gates attorney representing Southwestern
118. Id. at 1150-56 (summarizing divergent arguments of parties on definition
of royalty).
119. See id. at 1151-53 (summarizing landowners' arguments).
120. Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1153-56 (summarizing gas companies' arguments).
121. Id. at 1157 (discussing whether royalty should be construed in accord
with common usage or technical meaning adopted by industry).
122. Id. (concluding term royalty has "peculiar and appropriate" meaning
within Pennsylvania gas industry, and rules of statutory construction advise to follow such technical definition).
123. Id. (moving to next steps of statutory construction without addressing
argument for common usage).
124. See id. (quoting WILLIAMS AND MEYERS, supra note 30) (providing technical definition of royalty).
125. Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1157 (explaining distinction between production and
post-production costs). Production costs, which must always be borne fully by the
lessor extractor, encompasses those costs incurred before the gas reaches the surface of the property. Id.
126. Id. (noting production expenses are not subtracted from royalty
calculations).
127. Id. (noting production costs are not at issue in present case).
128. Id. (concluding technical definition of royalty allows exclusion of postproduction costs). Post-production costs are borne pro rata by royalty holders in
accordance with the royalty share percentage. Id.
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in Kilmer.129 The court additionally cited Williston on Contracts for
the notion that "generally the royalty is not payable from the gross
profit but from the net amount remaining after the deduction of
certain production and development costs." 3 0
C.

Issues of Competitive Fairness Among Landowners

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted the gas companies'
assertion that even in the modern-day gas industry, gas royalties can
be accepted in-kind, as well as in the form of cash proceeds from
the sale of the gas.' 3 1 A landowner taking a royalty in-kind physically collects the raw gas extracted and captures it for his own
uses.132 Thus, the court reasoned a royalty taken in-kind should be
of equivalent value to one taken as cash proceeds from a sale.' 3 3
The value of the gas sold as a marketable product to an end user
would far exceed the value of gas in raw form collected and stored
by the landowner at the site of the wellhead.13 4 The court reasoned
the Pennsylvania General Assembly "would not intend to create a
situation where one landowner would receive a dramatically increased royalty . . . [than] a neighbor who took the royalty in-

kind." 3 5
The court recognized a second issue of fairness among landowners: the potential for divergent values of gas leases depending
on the specific sales practices of the gas company with whom they
enter a lease agreement. 3 6 If a gas company chooses to handle the
processing and delivery of gas all the way to the terminal end user,
the first marketable product doctrine creates an outsized royalty
payment to that company's lessor landowners relative to others. 37
129. See id. (deriving analysis of relationship between definition of royalty and
net back calculations from George A. Bibikos and Jeffrey C. King). For a discussion of the Bibikos and King approach, see supra note 6 at 168-69.
130. Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1157 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (quoting
17 Williston on Contracts § 50:60 (4th ed. 2009)) (discussing royalties).
131. Id. at 1158 (observing gas royalties can still be taken in-kind).
132. Id. at 1154 (recognizing landowners can take in-kind royalties, though
impractical).
133. Id. at 1158 (giving credence to gas companies' argument that royalties in
cash and in-kind should be equivalent).
134. See id. (indicating severe discrepancies would result between two types of
royalties if first marketable product doctrine was adopted).
135. Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1158 (reasoning legislature would not have intended
such discrepancy).
136. Id. (finding leasehold values would be different since lessor gas extractor's practices are out of lessee's control).
137. Id. (explaining gas company business operations have greatest effect on
royalties under first marketable product doctrine).
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Many gas companies may sell the gas in a lesser processed form at
regional collection sites that are further from large markets such as
New York, which would result in a lower royalty payment if following the first marketable product doctrine. 3 8 Different gas company trade practices could create a situation in which two
Pennsylvania neighbors with equivalent gas reserves beneath their
land receive drastically different royalty compensation based on the
trade practice of their respective gas company lessees.139 The court
found this potential inequity to be inherently undesirable, and
noted that following a net back calculation methodology would arrive at similar royalties for similarly-situated landowners.1 4 0
The last major landowners' concern rejected by the court is
that the net back methodology created an incentive for gas companies to inflate their post-production costs, thereby driving down royalty payments to landowners.141 The court dismisses this concern as
baseless because the royalty is calculated as a one-eighth share, and
the gas company accordingly bears the remaining seven-eighths of
the post-production costs.1 42 Basic economic logic indicated artificially inflating such costs would hurt the lessee gas company's profits more than it would save the company on royalty distributions. 4 3
If landowners are genuinely concerned about possible improprieties in the calculation of deducted post-production costs, they have
a right to seek a court-ordered accounting-not the right to invalidate their leases.1 44
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court unanimously concluded the
GMRA permits the use of net back calculations to arrive at the value
of gas "at the wellhead."145 The court affirmed the Susquehanna
County Court of Common Pleas grant of summary judgment to the
gas companies.' 4 6
138. See id. (explaining geographic distance from consumption centers severely impacts royalty amounts).
139. See id. (highlighting equity among landowners as benefit of net-back
method).
140. Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1158 (finding net back calculation resolved issues in
favorable manner).
141. Id. (explaining landowners' final contention).
142. Id. (rejecting landowners' logic because gas companies bear greater burden of potentially inflated costs than landowners, thereby defeating motivation to
inflate costs).
143. Id. (explaining consequences of inflating post-production costs).
144. Id. (noting landowners' retain right to seek court accountings).
145. Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1158 (concluding net back calculations are included
in value calculation).
146. Id. (affirming trial court holding).
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CRITCAL ANALYSIS

The underlying question of law in Kilmer is a matter of statutory
interpretation: specifically, what was the Pennsylvania General Assembly's intended definition of royalty when creating the
GMRA?' 4 7 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, three decades after
the Act's passage, follows the mandated process for statutory interpretation. 148 The court's conclusion at each step of the process
proved critical to arrive at the ultimate decision to permit the net
back methodology.14 9 At each step, however, the court failed to either acknowledge or give adequate treatment to opposing facts or
arguments persuasive toward an alternative decision.o5 0 Aside from
initial treatment of the parties' briefed arguments, the court's final
opinion on the question in Kilmer is short in both verbiage and citation to precedent. 15 1 It therefore seems the court knew the ultimate decision it sought to reach, and made a conclusion with
relatively limited legal analysis.152
A.

The Court's Decision to Utilize a Technical Definition

At the outset, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's opinion in
Kilmer recognized the first question was whether the term royalty
had "acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning." 5 3 Terms in
Pennsylvania statutes are construed in accordance with their common usage unless they are deemed technical according to the
above test.15 4 The majority in Kilmer cites a definition of royalty
from a technical source.1 55 The court used this technical definition
moving forward, therefore asserting royalty is a technical term and
dispelling any possibility of analyzing the term in accordance with
147. See id. at 1149 (stating question presented to Pennsylvania Supreme
Court).
148. See id. at 1156-57 (applying laws of statutory construction to definition of
royalty).
149. See Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1156-58 (applying statutorily mandated process for
Pennsylvania statutory interpretation).
150. See id. (excluding consideration of plaintiffs' argument beyond summation in beginning of opinion).
151. See id. (spanning only three pages in Pennsylvania Reports and citing
only two prior cases in process of statutory interpretation).
152. See id. (concluding technical definition of royalty according to defendants' preferred literature is binding upon parties).
153. See Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1157 (citing 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1903 (West
1972) for rules of statutory interpretation) (determining whether royalty is technical term under rules for Pennsylvania statutory interpretation).
154. Id. (restating rules of statutory interpretation).
155. Id. (citing WILLIAMS & MEYERs, supra note 30) (giving technical definition of royalty).
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its plain dictionary meaning.' 5 6 The Kilmer opinion does not grant
the same treatment to common and technical usages of the term
royalty as other seminal opinions on gas leasing issues such as Garman chose to do.1 57
The Garman opinion, establishing the first marketable product
doctrine in Colorado, contains a well-reasoned analysis for why royalty cannot be construed according to a technical meaning in the
gas-leasing context.15 8 According to the Colorado Supreme Court,
a party to a gas lease contract cannot be bound in contract to an
industry custom the party cannot be expected to understand. 5 9 In
a gas lease situation, the landowner can be expected to be dealing
with a sophisticated commercial gas company for the first and only
time in their life.' 6 0 When the landowner agrees in contract to
lease the mineral rights to the gas company, the parties agree on
terms mutually understood. 16 1 In this factual scenario, as envisioned by the court in Garman, it is expected the landowner understands royalty in accordance with its common usage definition
rather than a highly technical interpretation available only in specialized trade manuals.162
The court's citation to an article from the Texas Journal of Oil,
Gas & Energy, written by Bibikos and King, for elaboration on the
technical meaning of royalty raises concern. 163 Bibikos, a K&L
Gates attorney in Pennsylvania specializing in energy issues, litigated for the gas companies in Kilmer.'6 4 He wrote the article detailing the meaning of gas royalties in 2008, and explicitly
156. See id. (concluding royalty should be construed according to its peculiar
and appropriate meaning).
157. See Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652, 660-61 (Colo. 1994) (concluding post-production costs prior to creating marketable gas product may not be
charged back to landowners via reduced royalties); see also Kropa v. Cabot Oil &
Gas Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 372, 379-81 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (analyzing meaning of
royalty in GMRA); Stone v. Elexco Land Servs., Inc., No. 3:09cv264, 2009 WL
515251, at *4-7 (M.D. Pa. Jun. 1, 2009) (providing similar treatment to issue).
158. See Garman886 P.2d at 658-61 (surveying other states' rationales for arriving at first marketable product doctrine in cases analogous to Kilmer).
159. Id. at 660 (explaining common law precedent that parties to lease can
only be bound by terms they understand).
160. Id. (alluding that landowners do not engage in negotiations with gas
companies or other sophisticated parties on regular basis).
161. Id. (describing industry practice of securing lease interests).
162. Id. (indicating landowner has no reason to be aware of technical tradeusage of term royalty).
163. See Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1157 (citing to Bibikos and King, supra note 6, at
169) (elaborating on technical meaning of royalty).
164. Bibikos & King, supra note 6, at n.al (providing biographical detail on
authors); see also Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1148 (providing names of attorneys representing appellants).
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contemplated the impact of forthcoming litigation over GMRA interpretation.165 Yet the Pennsylvania Supreme Court cited to the
subjective opinion of one of the attorneys arguing before it as definitive and authoritative.16 6
The court in Kilmer fails to acknowledge landowners in gas
leases are less sophisticated parties who can only be expected to
read the plain meaning of terms into their leases.' 6 While the Garman case was solely about interpreting the terms of an individual
lease, as opposed to the generally applicable statute in Kilmer, the
purpose of the GMRA is to protect Pennsylvania landowners and
the statutory terms must be read to remediate the problem they are
designed to address. 168 In dispensing with a plain meaning analysis
of the term royalty, the court made an initial determination
preventing statutes from remediating the underlying societal problem they were intended to address. 6 9

B.

The Court's Opinion Does Not Give Treatment to lams and
the Implied Duty to Market
The federal district courts in Pennsylvania were wrestling with

cases that required interpretation of the GMRA concurrently with
the appeal in Kilmer.17 0 Judge James M. Munley of the Middle District of Pennsylvania heard the controversies in both Kropa and

Stone, and recognized the potential validity of the first marketable
product doctrine in both instances.171 In deciding these cases,
Judge Munley found that courts recognized the tenets of the first
marketable product doctrine in states where courts had long-standing common laws guaranteeing an implied duty to market.' 7 2 Both
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and Judge Munley recognized
165. See Bibikos & King, supra note 6, at 181-84 (building case to protect net
back methodology by claiming it is widely used across United States).
166. Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1157-58 (implying article co-authored by Bibikos and
King is treatise, on par with Williston on Contracts as authority on subject).
167. See id. at 1156-58 (noting absent treatment of potentially using common
definition).
168. See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921 (West 1972) (explaining how to ascertain legislature's general intent).
169. Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1157-58 (failing to interpret statute in light of "object
to be attained" and instead focusing on technical definition).
170. See id. at 1152-53 (describing cases in federal district court on this issue).
171. See Stone v. Elexco Land Servs., Inc., No. 3:09cv264, 2009 WL 1515251, at
*3-8 (M.D. Pa. Jun. 1, 2009) (accepting first marketable product doctrine as viable
conclusion); see also Kropa v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 372, 380-81
(M.D. Pa. 2009) (interpreting plaintiffs' first marketable product doctrine-based
argument).
172. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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lams and other 19th century precedents establishing the implied
duty to market the extracted natural gas in Pennsylvania.' 7 3 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Kilmer, however, gave no explicit
reason why it disregarded the conclusion many other state courts
previously reached.17 4 The implied duty to market inherently yields
the first marketable product doctrine.' 7 5
C.

Interpreting the GMRA to Remediate the Issue at Hand
When Passed in 1979

When the Pennsylvania Supreme Court initially decided to interpret the term royalty in accordance with a technical meaning
and subsequently decided the meaning included the net back
method, the court remained silent on other statutory interpretation
mandates."'7 A Pennsylvania statute mandates statutory interpretation in accordance with legislative intent of the General Assembly. 7 7 The pertinent statute states: "when the words of a statute are
not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly may be ascertained by considering .

.

. the occasion and necessity for the stat-

ute."' 78

This statute names seven other factors a court should
consider, all of which lead a court to assume the legislature meant
to remedy the problem in mind when passing the law in question.' 7 9 The intent of the General Assembly in passing the GMRA
was to prevent landowners from being "exploited."' 8 0 In light of
that general intent, the Pennsylvania rules of statutory interpretation advise the court to interpret the law in a manner that contin-

173. Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1152-53 (noting lams and other 19th century precedents established implied duty to market extracted natural gas in Pennsylvania).
174. See id. at 1156-58 (giving no explanation for why Pennsylvania does not
recognize connection between implied duty to market and first marketable product doctrine).
175. See id. (holding net back is appropriate default interpretation without
distinguishing plaintiffs cited precedent).
176. See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1921-22 (West 1972) (suggesting considerations for Pennsylvania courts when interpreting statutory provisions and intent
behind them).
177. See id. § 1921 (describing guidance provided by rules of statutory interpretation to determine legislative intent).
178. Id. § 1921(c) (listing factors for consideration).
179. Id. (listing factors for court to consider when interpreting statute).
180. See Legislative Journal - Senate, Pennsylvania General Assembly, S.B.
568, Bill on Third Consideration and Final Passage (statements of Senators Stapleton and Hager) (June 21, 1979) (illustrating intent of General Assembly).
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ues to protect landowners' royalty interests from unfair practices of
the more sophisticated counterparts in their lease agreements. 8 1
VI.

A.

IMPACT

The Kilmer Case Defines the Legal Framework for
Interpreting Oil and Gas Law in the Future.

Kilmer not only decided the fate of the seventy landowner suits
awaiting the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision on net back
royalty calculations, it also set the tone for future decisions in conflicts arising from mineral rights leases in Pennsylvania.18 2 Issues of
oil and gas law surrounding the development of Marcellus Shale
gas drilling are firmly on the minds of the Pennsylvania bar and
bench. 8 3 Kilmer indicated courts will interpret gas lease terms,
under Pennsylvania law, in accordance with the technical meaning
acquired over time within the gas industry.184 While it is unclear
exactly how many leasing conflicts will turn on courts interpretation
of technical lease terms, courts have already begun to broadly interpret the Kilmer holdings to affirm the validity of royalty calculations
favoring the gas company when roughly similar to those at issue in
Kilmer.'8 5

The federal district court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (the same court that questioned the validity of the net back
calculation in Stone and Kropa) recently decided three cases in
which landowners were bound by lease terms that calculated royal181. See Kilmer v. Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 990 A.2d 1147, 1152-54 (Pa. 2010)
(discussing landowners' royalty interest in light of unfair distribution of knowledge
between landowners and gas companies).
182. SeeJoel R. Burcat, Oil and Gas Law: 2010 Litigation and Legislation Update,
PENNSYLVANIA BAR INSTITUTE 6-7 Uan. 2010), http://www.saul.com/common/publications/pdf 2214.pdf (explaining how Kilmer set tone for future gas law decisions
in Pennsylvania).
183. See id. at 4-15 (covering gas law extensively in training materials).

184. See David W. Hardymon, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Defines "Royalty ": Approves Post-Production Costs and Net-Back to the Wellhead Calculation of Royalty, OHIO
OIL & GAS ASSOcIATION BULLETIN, March/April 2010, at 3, 8 available at http://
(stating future
www.ooga.org/docs/Bulletins/2010/OOGABulletin-0304-10.pdf
impact of Kilmer may include further technical interpretations of statutory
language).
185. See Veronica Finkelstein, Marcellus Shale DrillingProjects Increase Following
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Decision, CONSTRUCTION LAw SIGNAL BLOG (Aug. 31,
2010), http://www.constructionlawsignal.com/by-state/pennsylvania-1/marcellusshale-drilling-projects-increase-following-pennsylvania-supreme-court-decision/
(elaborating on recent construction deals for gas rigs that were made following
Kilmer).
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ties by deducting the post-production expenses.' 8 6 The district
court interpreted Kilmer and found that the leases, unlike those in
Kilmer that were silent on post-production expense deductions, can
be reasonably interpreted to subtract post-production expenses
from royalty calculations.18 7 Subsequent decisions after Kilmer have
established the net back royalty calculation as the default rule for
questions of royalty interpretation.' 8 8
From the perspective of Pennsylvania landowners sitting atop
Marcellus Shale gas deposits, the Kilmer decision serves as a cautionary tale.' 8 9 The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette understated the effect of
Kilmer on subsequent decisions interpreting gas leases when it
stated Kilmer "drives home the need for landowners to do some research before entering into a lease with a drilling company." 9 0
The same news article quoted a gas company spokesman advising
landowners "the best advice, no matter how poor you are, is to go
see a lawyer before you sign anything."191 As legal commentators
noted, courts will be interpreting gas lease provisions in accordance
with a technical meaning that no layperson could reasonably be expected to comprehend, though the landowners will later be bound
to the terms.192 The landowners in Kilmer and analogous cases today suffer from a severe case of buyer's remorse.' 9 3 Without highly
trained representation, Pennsylvania landowners may continue to
receive relatively raw deals that minimize compensation paid for
186. See George A. Bibikos & David R. Fine, Oil and Gas Alert: Applying
Kilmer's Holding Broadly to Other Types of Net-Back Leases: The Lauchle, Beach, and
Hooker Decisions, K & L GATES 1-2 (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.klgates.com/files/
Publication/1e774111-6acb-44d0-b750-0b3bb86b97b2/Presentation/Publication
Attachment/ l0b960bf-33bl-4417-8c73-0cf19d2817d3/OGA.101410.pdf (explaining Kilmer has been broadly interpreted).
187. See id. (summarizing holdings of recent federal district court cases on net
back issue).
188. See id. at 2 (stating conclusion of attorneys within firm publishing paper).
189. See generally Torsten Ove, Landowners Settle with Marcellus Shale Driller,
PIrrSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jul. 23, 2010, available at http://www.post-gazette.
com/pg/10204/1074682-455.stm (explaining relationship between lessee landowners and lessor gas companies in light of recent Pennsylvania court decisions).
190. See id. (stating need for landowners to be wary in reaching royalty
agreements).
191. Id. (advising landowners to seek legal counsel when negotiating gas
leases).
192. See generally Stacia A. Christman & Gregg M. Rosen, Legal Updates: Big Win
for Gas Companies in Pennsylvania Marcellus Shale Royalties Case, McGuiRE WOODS
LLP (Apr. 2, 2010), http://www.mcguirewoods.com/news-resources/item.asp?
item=4672 (noting ramification of Kilmer will be expectation of being bound to
terms according to technical definition).
193. See Ove, supra note 189 (explaining landowners in older leases are upset
because they earn significantly less than counterparts who signed leases post-2008).
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the increasingly valuable shale gas reserves lying deep beneath their
land.19 4
B.

Protected Economic Value of Marcellus Shale Drilling

This Casenote identified several faults in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's rationale in Kilmer.195 The court, unanimous in its
approval of the gas companies' net back methodology, was greatly
concerned with the potential "catastrophic" impact on the Pennsylvania oil and gas industry and the state's economy as a whole.196
In the face of the potential economic impact, the court may have
forsaken a detailed analysis of the arguments supporting a first marketable product doctrine-based rule in favor of protecting a vitally
important Pennsylvania industry.' 9 7 In the wake of Kilmer, the gas
industry exhaled a sigh of relief, and began seeking new mineral
leases for new drilling operation that were previously shelved while
the court interpreted the GMRA.19 8
The court was undoubtedly aware of the total economic impact
on the Marcellus gas industry in Pennsylvania.19 9 Marcellus gas producers collectively spent $3.1 billion within Pennsylvania in 2008
alone. 200 Based on estimated economic multipliers, the industry in
2010 is estimated to have an $8 billion impact on the state's gross
domestic product.20 1 The industry adds as many as 100,000 jobs to
the Pennsylvania economy, and yields $872 million in tax revenues
to state and local tax collectors' coffers. 202 Kilmer put this industry
in jeopardy by questioning the validity of all gas leases in the state
designed to comply with the GMRA while following a net back royalty methodology. 203 The primary motivator for gas companies to
194. Id. (advising landowners to seek legal counsel in negotiating leases).
195. For a critical analysis of the Kilmer decision, see supra notes 147-181.
196. Christman & Rosen, supra note 192 (explaining potential economic
ramifications of alternative decision).
197. See infra notes 199-202 (describing economic contribution of Marcellus
Shale to Pennsylvania economy).
198. See Finkelstein, supra note 185 (noting reinvigoration of gas-extraction
construction post-Kilmer).
199. See Kilmer v. Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 990 A.2d 1147, 1149-50 (Pa. 2010)
(describing Marcellus Shale as significant natural resource being developed in
Pennsylvania).
200. See CONSIDINE ET AL., supra note 1, at 21 (discussing total spending of
business entities drilling gas in-state).
201. Id. at 23 (discussing impact on economy adjusted for estimate future
rates of growth within natural gas industry).
202. Id. (discussing labor and tax inputs into Pennsylvania economy).
203. See Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1148 (recognizing GMRA applies to all gas leases
in Pennsylvania, and changes in interpretation of law will subsequently affect all
leases).
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continue adding such enormous value to the Pennsylvania economy is a combination of high profit margins and a favorable business climate.20 4 An contrary holding in Kilmer would have
threatened profit margins by increasing mandatory royalty payments and destabilized the business climate by creating a massive
litigation risk.2 05 The landowners suffering from buyers' remorse
were bound by the gas companies' most profitable pre-2008
leases-leases that, if voided, could unbalance the high-profit business operations of Pennsylvania gas drillers. 20 6 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court was especially eager to prevent such devastating tumult in the rapidly developing natural gas sector of Pennsylvania's
economy. 20 7
Michael Monis*
204. See CONSIDINE ET AL., supranote 1, at 28-30 (discussing how primary business drivers for gas drilling in Pennsylvania are based on friendly business climate
in-state).
205. See Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1150-51 (recognizing GMRA is applicable to large
proportion of gas leases in Pennsylvania, and over seventy cases on court dockets
await interpretation).
206. See id. at 1150 (noting remedy sought by plaintiffs includes termination
of current leases). With a significant number of cases awaiting the outcome of this
decision, a different outcome could have forced drillers to renegotiate leases
before continuing operations. Id. at 1151.
207. See id. at 1158 (exercising extraordinary jurisdiction in order to issue
unanimous opinion affirming gas companies' preferred calculation methodology).
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, Villanova University School of Law; A.B. 2008, Georgetown University.
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